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NOTE   
A TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
AND BEYOND: FOCUSING ON A BROAD 
INTERPRETATION OF THE STORED  
COMMUNICATIONS ACT    
Nicole R. Canale† 
ABSTRACT 
In the 21st century, it is more likely that your e-mail account will be 
hacked than your home burglarized. E-mail is used by hundreds of 
thousands of individuals, and this technological dependence only continues 
to grow. Individuals want and need this electronic communication to be 
protected. To satisfy this desire, Congress passed the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”). This statute prohibits an individual from 
obtaining or altering access to a wire or electronic communication while it 
is in electronic storage. In other words, Congress designed the SCA to 
protect an individual’s e-mail access. However, the SCA—passed in the 
1980s—was not intended to deal with the evolving technology of e-mail.  
Due to this upgrade in technology, the SCA is inconsistently applied 
among the courts. Specifically, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have split over 
the interpretation of the SCA in the cases of Anzaldua v. Northeast 
Ambulance & Fire Protection District and Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 
respectively. In Theofel, the Ninth Circuit held to a broad interpretation of 
the SCA, while the Eighth Circuit in Anzaldua kept to a narrower 
interpretation of the SCA. Consequently, the holdings of the courts were 
completely different—only one holding that the e-mail was protected—even 
though they dealt with similar issues.  
There is a need for many areas of e-mail privacy protection to be 
strengthened—or at the very least defined—so that individuals may take 
precautions. This Note will address this missing gap in our technological 
world and provide a recommendation that the SCA be broadly interpreted. 
It will show that a narrow interpretation is not proper, as it avoids the 
original intent of the SCA. This Note will show that a broad interpretation 
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is also capable of being applied by all courts due to the canons of 
construction in statutory interpretation. This interpretation will allow for a 
solution that will be an adequate protection as technology changes in the 
years to come.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, over 205 billion e-mails were sent and received per day, and this 
figure is only expected to grow.1 By 2019, individuals will send more than 
246 billion e-mails per day.2 E-mail has become an individual’s way to 
communicate quickly, efficiently, and easily with anyone in the world. 
While individuals seldom give thought to how an e-mail gets to the 
recipient, most have strong views on who may view that e-mail. Most of 
these individuals also have strong views about the importance of this 
privacy in their everyday lives.3 They believe it is important—often very 
important—that they maintain privacy and confidentiality in commonplace 
activities of their lives.4  
This Note will focus on Title II of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”): The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), and its 
application to individuals maintaining privacy and confidentially with their 
e-mail. It will begin with an analysis of the ECPA, the SCA, and the 
legislative history behind these Acts. This Note will explain how the SCA 
relates to the issue of e-mail with its phrase, “electronic storage for backup 
purposes,” and how courts have interpreted this language differently to 
afford e-mail protection only when it is interpreted broadly.   
In Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Protection District, 793 F.3d 
822 (8th Cir. 2015), and Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 
2004), both courts interpreted “electronic storage for backup purposes” 
from the viewpoint of current technology, rather than looking at technology 
back with the SCA was enacted in the 1980’s. Although looking at 
technology from the same view, and under similar facts, the two courts took 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., E-mail Statistics Report, 2015-2019, 
http://radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Email-Statistics-Report-2015-2019-
Executive-Summary.pdf. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and 
Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-
surveillance/. 
 4. Id. 93% of adults say that being in control of who can get information about them is 
important; 74% feel this is “very important,” while 19% say it is “somewhat important.” Id. 
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very different approaches to their interpretation of the phrase. Anzaldua, 
interpreting the phrase narrowly, concluded the e-mail was not protected. 
Theofel, holding to a broad interpretation, found that the e-mail was 
protected.  
As such, there is a gap in privacy coverage under the SCA. This Note will 
suggest a way Congress may interpret electronic storage to bridge that gap. 
It will argue for a broad interpretation of the SCA, one that will be 
applicable in the years to come. 
II.  THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT AND THE STORED 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
As e-mail use is growing exponentially in the 21st century, an 
individual’s electronic property increasingly needs to be protected from 
prying eyes. This was Congress’ original intent when it passed 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2510-2522—the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.5 The 
ECPA is made up of three titles: Title I (Wiretap Act), Title II (Stored 
Communications Act), and Title III (Pen Register and Trap and Trace 
Devices).6 It is ultimately the Stored Communications Act that primarily 
protects an individual’s e-mail use.  
A. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act  
The ECPA was adopted to protect wire, oral, and electronic 
communications that are being made, are in transit, and when they are 
stored on computers.7 Title II: The Stored Communications Act,8 added 
new statutory provisions that explicitly strengthened the protection of e-
mail by strengthening the privacy of stored electronic communications, 
either before such a communication is transmitted to the recipient or after 
it is delivered and stored as a copy.9   
                                                                                                                                      
 5. U.S. Department of Justice, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 
JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING (July 30, 2013), 
https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1285.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. It applies to communication like e-mail, telephone conversations, and data 
stored electronically. Id.   
 8. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-12 (West). 
 9. Offices of the United States Attorneys, 1061. Unlawful Access to Stored 
Communications, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1061-unlawful-access-stored-
communications-18-usc-2701. 
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B. The Stored Communications Act  
1. Original Intent of the SCA 
Congress’ original intent in passing the SCA was to address the growing 
problem of unauthorized persons deliberately gaining access to, or 
tampering with, electronic or wire communications that were not intended 
to be available to the public.10 In light of this importance of 
communications to interstate and foreign commerce, the SCA’s prevention 
of unauthorized access to the systems used for such communication was for 
a legitimate federal concern. 11   
2. What is Protected by the SCA? 
The opening section of the Stored Communications Act, § 2701, sets the 
scope of an individual’s e-mail protection. § 2701(a) makes it an offense to 
intentionally access without authorization, or to exceed an authorization to 
access, an electronic communication service and thereby obtain, alter, or 
prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is 
in electronic storage in such system.12 To ultimately understand what the 
SCA protects, one must understand each of the Act’s integral elements: (1) 
electronic communication service; (2) wire or electronic communication; 
and (3) electronic storage.  
a. Electronic storage13 
The SCA protects communication if it is in electronic storage. § 2510(17) 
of the ECPA defines electronic storage as: “(a) any temporary, intermediate 
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic 
transmission; or (b) any storage of such communication by an electronic 
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such 
communication.”14  
Electronic storage focuses when, what, and why the communication was 
stored. For the SCA to provide protection, the ECPA is concerned that the 
wire or electronic communication is stored temporarily or intermediately, 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, 62 (1986). 
 11. Id. at 63.  
 12. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A § 2701(a) (West) (emphasis added).   
 13. To avoid redundancy, this Note starts with the definition of element (3) “electronic 
storage” because within this definition, both elements (1) and (2) are mentioned.  
 14. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17) (West). This note 
will have a focus on analyzing case law under Section 2510(17)(B) when courts have 
interpreted the phrase “for the purposes of backup protection.” 
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or that wire or electronic communication, stored by an electronic 
communication service, was stored purposefully as backup protection.15  
b. Wire or electronic communication 
For the SCA to grant protection under § 2510(17)(A) and (B), the 
communication must be wire or electronic in both instances. Section A of § 
2510(17) is fairly straightforward in this application because it explicitly 
protects “wire or electronic communication” if temporarily or immediately 
placed in storage.16 However, section B of § 2510(17), does not explicitly 
mention the words “wire or electronic communication.” Nevertheless, 
communication under Section B must be in this form for the SCA to grant 
protection. This is due to the words “such communication.” Courts have 
determined that the phrase “such communication” is simply referencing § 
2510(17)(A) when it uses the language “wire or electronic 
communication.”17  
Wire communication is defined by the ECPA as: 
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of 
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of 
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin 
and the point of reception (including the use of such connection 
in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person 
engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the 
transmission of interstate or foreign communications or 
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.18  
Electronic communication is defined by the ECPA as:  
[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a 
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
                                                                                                                                      
 15. For the purposes of this Note, ultimately, the focus will be on whether an electronic 
communication is stored for the purpose of backup protection and therefore, this section 
will break down only 2510(17)(B). Section 2510(17)(A) is included for the interpretation and 
understanding of the SCA as a whole and Section (B) in particular to the phrase “such 
communication.”  
 16. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(7) (West). 
 17. Bailey v. Bailey, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008). It does not also 
include the requirement that the electronic communications be “incidental to the electronic 
transmission.” If that were the case, there would be no need to write them as two separate 
meanings. Id.  
 18. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(1) (West). 
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system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not 
include— 
(A) any wire or oral communication; 
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging 
device; 
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in 
section 3117 of this title); or 
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial 
institution in a communications system used for the electronic 
storage and transfer of funds.19 
c. Electronic Communication Service  
The SCA’s protection does not apply until the wire or electronic 
communication is stored by an electronic communication service. 
Electronic communication service (“ECS”) is broadly defined as “any 
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or 
electronic communications.”20 Unless the wire or electronic communication 
fits within this SCA protected category, only the Fourth Amendment will 
protect the communication.21  
d. For the purposes of backup protection  
Finally, for the SCA to protect the wire or electronic communication that 
has been stored by an ECS, the communication must have been stored for 
the purposes of backup protection.22 The ECPA has not defined exactly 
what “for the purposes of backup protection” means. Therefore, this 
element of the SCA has been left to the interpretation of the courts. 
Unfortunately, courts like the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have not been able 
to discern Congress’ intent regarding this phrase, which has caused multiple 
circuit splits as to what is protected under the SCA.23  
III.  E-MAIL IS PROTECTED UNDER THE SCA 
Having defined the broad elements that must be met for the SCA to 
grant protection: (1) an electronic communication service; (2) wire or 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(12) (West). 
 20. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(15) (West).  
 21. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1213 (2004). 
 22. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17)(B) (West).  
 23. See infra Section V. 
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electronic communication; and (3) electronic storage,24 this Note will now 
apply the SCA’s scope of protection to e-mail.  
The SCA protects any electronic communication when it is a wire or 
electronic communication and stored by an ECS. This includes the 
transmission of e-mail. E-mail is protected because it is a form of electronic 
communication, that when stored by an ECS, can meet the definition of 
electronic storage if stored for the proper purposes. It is this last 
requirement, the purpose of why the e-mail was stored, which causes courts 
to continue to have difficulty determining the SCA’s scope of protection to 
e-mail in the 21st century.  
A. E-mail as an Electronic Communication  
The definition of electronic communication is broad enough to include 
e-mail. For example, almost all internet communications qualify as 
electronic communications.25 As such, “there can be no doubt that [the 
definition of electronic communication] is broad enough to encompass e-
mail communications.”26  
B. E-mail is Stored by an Electronic Communication Service 
Both unopened and opened e-mails are stored by electronic 
communication services. When e-mail is received, but sits unopened on the 
internet service provider’s (“ISP”) server, the ISP is acting as a provider of 
ECS. 27 Internet service providers are companies such as Comcast Xfinity, 
At&T internet, or Version Fios,28 and will receive the e-mail from e-mail 
clients or web mail. Therefore, the e-mail is protected under the SCA by the 
ISP.    
The protections under the SCA are not as clear-cut for opened e-mails. 
Traditionally, courts reasoned that when an individual left a copy of an 
already-accessed e-mail stored on a server, the e-mail no longer fell under 
                                                                                                                                      
 24. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
 25. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 26. In re Application of United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d 13, 16 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 27. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1215 (2004); see also In re Doubleclick 
Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 28. 20 Top Internet Service Providers, PRACTICALECOMMERCE, 
https://www.practicalecommerce.com/20-Top-Internet-Service-Providers.  
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an electronic communication service; rather, the e-mail was just in remote 
storage.29  
However, this line of reasoning changed with Theofel v. Farey-Jones. The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that all e-mails held by a server were protected 
under the ECS rules until “the underlying message [] expired in the normal 
course.”30 This was regardless of whether the e-mail had been opened or 
not.31  
While the SCA broadly protects ECS storage, it is not designed to protect 
the privacy of all Internet communications.32 The ECS rules require that, for 
the SCA’s scope of protection to be granted, the ECS must be accessed 
without permission, leading to the alteration of electronic communication 
in electronic storage.33  
C. E-mail is Electronic Storage 
Since e-mail is an electronic communication that may be stored by an 
ECS, the only element left to prove that e-mail is electronic storage (and 
thus protected under the SCA) is whether it was stored as electronic storage 
in either: (1) temporary, intermediate storage, or (2) for the purposes of 
backup protection.  
1. When is an E-mail Protected as Temporary, Intermediate Storage?  
“There is no question that the SCA protects unopened e-mails stored on 
e-mail servers before they are delivered to, and opened by, their 
recipients.”34 The SCA applies in instances such as these because unopened 
e-mails fall into § 2510(17)(A) and are in “temporary, intermediate storage” 
when pending delivery.35  
                                                                                                                                      
 29. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1217 (2004). The Stored 
Communications Act does have protections in place for remote storage (RCS), but they are 
not at issue in this Note since the change with Theofel. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 1214. 
 33. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A § 2701(a) (West).   
 34. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA, 
HAYNES AND BOONE, 
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).  
 35. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA, 
HAYNES AND BOONE, 
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2. When is an E-mail Protected For the Purposes of Backup 
Protection?  
Once opened, server-resident e-mails are no longer protected by the SCA 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) because in Cruz Lopez v. Pena the court 
found that this type of e-mail is “no longer stored incident to 
transmission.”36 The question then is whether opened e-mails are protected 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B), “for purposes of backup protection.”37  
This status for opened e-mails remains unclear. Courts under the Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits struggle with the fact that neither the SCA nor the ECPA 
define “backup protection.”38 Courts like Theofel have held that yes, e-mail 
opened on an ISP is stored for the purposes of backup protection. However, 
courts like Anzaldua, have held the opposite and found that because the e-
mail was not stored for backup protection, it was not electronic storage, and 
therefore, not granted protection under the SCA. This Note will discuss 
these cases, their holdings, and argue that Theofel’s broad interpretation 
illuminates the intent of the SCA, yet still grants adequate protection to 
individuals as technology advances in e-mail.   
IV.  THE SCA IN A 21ST CENTURY CONTEXT 
When Congress enacted the SCA, technology was vastly different than 
the digital landscape individuals face today. In the 21st century, access to e-
mail servers is broader than it was in the 1980s.  
Generally speaking, there are two types of e-mail accounts: (1) e-mail 
clients and (2) web mail.39 E-mail clients are programs such as Microsoft 
Office or Thunderbird.40 Web mail is provided through browsers like 
Gmail, Yahoo!, or Hotmail.41 With the expansion of these web-based 
programs, e-mail has become easier to access and store for the individual. 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).  
 36. Id. (citing Lopez I, at *4).  
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B). 
 38. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA, 
HAYNES AND BOONE, 
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
 39. Web Mail v. Email Clients, BASICCOMPUTERINFORMATION.CA, 
http://www.basiccomputerinformation.ca/web-mail-vs-email-clients/ (last visited Oct. 24, 
2016). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
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As such, the SCA has been interpreted to no longer covers certain e-mail 
storage, leaving individuals without critical privacy protection. To help fix 
this, Congress enacted amendments for e-mail privacy throughout the 
years, but such a patch will be insufficient to account for upcoming 
technological advances.  
A. A Technological Upgrade in E-mail  
When the SCA was created in 1986, public e-mail services were in their 
infancy and individuals only used e-mail clients.42 When using an e-mail 
client, the individual’s e-mail resided permanently on the ISP’s server.43 
Therefore, to access the e-mail, an individual needed to connect with the 
ISP server and download messages.44 Subscribers connected to private ISP 
networks though phone lines and they read e-mails on their personal 
computers.45  
In contrast, today, 56% of people use webmail services such as Hotmail, 
Gmail, or Yahoo! e-mail, over any other e-mail service.46 In fact, the first 
webmail service, Hotmail, was not created until 1996—ten years after the 
SCA was enacted.47 When an individual uses a webmail service, he can 
check for e-mail messages on any computer that has a web browser 
installed.48 To retrieve those e-mails, the individual only has to go to the 
web browser and find the webmail service.49 Once at the service, all the 
                                                                                                                                      
 42. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA, 
HAYNES AND BOONE, 
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx, (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
 43. Web-Based Email Vs. ISP, IT STILL WORKS, http://itstillworks.com/webbased-email-
vs-isp-3867.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.; see also Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the 
SCA, HAYNES AND BOONE, 
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
 46. John B. Horrigan, Use of Cloud Computing Applications and Services, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/2008/09/12/use-of-cloud-computing-
applications-and-services/.   
 47. World Wide Web Timeline, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/world-wide-web-timeline/ (last visited Oct. 24, 
2016).  
 48. Web-Based E-mail Vs. ISP, IT STILL WORKS, http://itstillworks.com/webbased-email-
vs-isp-3867.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
 49. Id. 
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individual has to do is log into the service, and the browser downloads the 
e-mail.50 “In the absence of an e-mail client, messages are not downloaded 
to the user’s personal device and remain on the server until expressly 
deleted.”51  
B. The E-mail Privacy Act of 2016  
When the SCA was passed, Congress could not have foreseen 
technological advances such as webmail. As a result, when e-mail evolved, it 
left individuals with gaps in their privacy protection.52 Accordingly, leading 
individuals in cyberspace law have said, “[i]t is time for Congress to step in 
and be more specific as to what stored communications means, and at the 
very least, make references to current technologies.”53  
In 2015, the House tried to be more specific by passing on to the Senate 
the E-mail Privacy Act.54 This amendment to the ECPA, among other 
things, “prohibit[s] a provider of remote computing service or electronic 
communication service to the public from knowingly divulging to a 
governmental entity the contents of any communication that is in electronic 
storage” and it will eliminate the difference in stored communications, 
whether such communications had been stored for fewer than, or more 
than, 180 days.55  
However, the E-mail Privacy Act is still under the Senate’s review.56 Even 
if both the House and Senate pass the Act, courts will still need explicit 
guidance on how to define electronic storage as technology advances 
quickly in the years to come. The E-mail Privacy Act will only clear up 
certain, narrow privacy issues. It will still leave several questions and 
conflicts regarding the definition of electronic storage for backup purposes 
                                                                                                                                      
 50. Id. 
 51. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA, 
HAYNES AND BOONE, 
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).  
 52. Kristen L. Burge, Circuit Split Creates Data Protection Uncertainty, LITIGATION 
NEWS (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/111115-electronic-
storage-protection.html (last visited Oct. 5th, 2016).  
 53. Id.  
 54. E-mail Privacy Act, H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 55. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (West) (This section contains the old 180-day rule. If 
the E-mail Privacy Act passes in the Senate, it will be removed). 
 56. E-mail Privacy Act, H.R. 387, 115th Cong. (2017-2018). Found at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/387.  
746 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:735 
 
unanswered. As a result, courts will remain split at both the federal and the 
state level.57  
V.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE DEFINITION OF ELECTRONIC STORAGE FOR 
BACKUP PURPOSES 
The most notable split to date regards the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. 
When faced with nearly the same factual situation and issue—whether an 
individual’s e-mails were protected by the SCA—the two circuits reached 
opposite conclusions.58 Each circuit analyzed whether the e-mail was stored 
for backup purposes under the electronic storage definition of 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(17)(B), but only the Ninth Circuit concluded that the e-mails were 
protected under the SCA.59  
The Ninth Circuit determined the standard definition of electronic 
storage for backup purposes in its 2004 decision, Theofel v. Farey-Jones.60 
There, the court held to a broad interpretation of electronic storage. It 
allowed e-mail to be protected under the SCA until the underlying message 
expired in the normal course of business because after that it would no 
longer be serving a backup function.61 The court also found that e-mails, 
which had been received, read, and left on the server, were stored for 
purposes of backup protection, and therefore were within the protection of 
the SCA.62  
However, under the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Anzaldua v. Northeast 
Ambulance & Fire Protection District,63 the SCA may no longer protect 
stored communication a user considers saved as a backup.64 The plaintiff in 
that case relied on the Ninth Circuit’s Theofel interpretation of electronic 
storage.65 He argued that his e-mail was protected under the SCA because it 
still served a backup purpose.66  
The Eighth Circuit disagreed. The court noted that the “electronic 
storage” requirement is commonly misunderstood because the statutory 
                                                                                                                                      
 57. Burge, supra note 52.   
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 61. Id. at 1070.  
 62. See generally id.  
 63. Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 64. Burge, supra note 52.   
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
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definition is much narrower than its name suggests.67 The court 
acknowledged that, under common parlance, while the plaintiff’s e-mail 
remained on the server it would serve as a “backup” for the sender; it no 
longer qualified as electronic storage under the SCA.68 The Eighth Circuit 
held this way because the plaintiff had no reason to access the purported 
backup copy after the e-mail had been successfully delivered.69 
As a result of these split decisions, individuals must “be very careful 
because [they] cannot expect to know how the court is going to interpret 
stored communications, especially if the content is stored in the e-mail 
system and accessible by the sender of the message.”70 To minimize the risk 
of litigation, “it is crucial to implement policies limiting or prohibiting 
access to personal accounts to avoid stored communication disputes.71  
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision  
The Ninth Circuit began first by interpreting the Stored 
Communications Act “in light of the common law.”72 The court dissected 
the SCA’s definition of electronic storage into two parts: “(A) any 
temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication 
incidental to the electronic transmission . . . and (B) any storage of such 
communication by an electronic communication service for the purposes of 
backup protection of such communication.”73 The court focused on part (B) 
of the definition: whether the e-mail was stored for purposes of backup 
protection.74  
The court viewed the subsection under the plain language of the Act.75 
Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the SCA offers protection when 
the purpose of storing a message on an ISP server after delivery is to provide 
a second copy of the message in the event that the user needed to download 
                                                                                                                                      
 67. Id.  
 68. Kristen L. Burge, Circuit Split Creates Data Protection Uncertainty, LITIGATION 
NEWS (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/111115-electronic-
storage-protection.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).   
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.    
 71. Id. 
 72. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1072. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075. 
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it again.76 The court rejected a Third Circuit interpretation in Fraser v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.77 that backup protection included only temporary 
backup storage pending delivery and not any form of post transmission 
storage.78  
The court noted that subsection (B) of the definition of electronic storage 
must include post transmission storage because “subsection (B) does not 
distinguish between intermediate and post transmission storage,” as 
subsection (A) does, and “since temporary backup storage pending 
transmission would already seem to qualify as ‘temporary, intermediate 
storage’ with the meaning of subsection (A), subsection (B) would then be 
rendered superfluous.”79 It is only when the underlying message has expired 
in the normal course that any copy will have thereby expired and would no 
longer be performing any backup function.80 It is only then that the e-mail 
would not be protected by the SCA.    
The court held that there was no dispute that messages remaining “on 
[the] server after delivery [were] stored ‘by an electronic communication 
service’” whether or not they had been previously delivered.81 The messages 
therefore served a backup purpose and were covered by the SCA.82 
B. The Eighth Circuit’s Decision  
The Eighth Circuit determined that while the district court erred in 
finding that the defendant had authorized access to the plaintiff’s e-mail 
account, he was still not afforded protection under the SCA because his e-
mails were not electronic storage within the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the Act.83 The court held that the plaintiff’s e-mails did not serve any 
backup function merely because copies of them remained on a webmail 
                                                                                                                                      
 76. Id. The court noted that “the mere fact that a copy could serve as a backup does not 
mean it is stored for that purpose.” Id. at 1076 (emphasis omitted). There are “many 
instances were an ISP could hold messages not in electronic storage,” such as an “e-mail sent 
to or from the ISP’s staff, or messages a [individual] has flagged for deletion from the server.” 
Id. at 1076.  
 77. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 78. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075.  
 79. Id. at 1075-76. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 1075-77. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 838.  
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server.84 The apparent test in the Eighth Circuit for serving a backup 
function is whether the user has “reason to believe that they may need to 
access an additional copy of the file in the future.”85 The plaintiff only 
argued that copies existed and did not further his argument by discussing a 
future need to access it.86 As such, the e-mails did not fall within the 
protection of the SCA according to the Eighth Circuit.87 
VI.  ANZALDUA AND THEOFEL IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER CIRCUITS 
Due to the 21st century changes in technology, now, more than ever, the 
SCA needs to be interpreted to include this growing expanse of electronic 
communication. Today, “people store e-mails by leaving them in their 
inboxes, sent mailbox, or deleted folders, where they can keep copies 
indefinitely.”88 By classifying these communications as electronic storage, 
the Theofel court expanded protection to e-mails stored on web-based 
servers.89  
Within the context of other circuits, one can not only see how courts 
have agreed and disagreed with the Theofel holding, but it becomes 
apparent that the interpretation of the SCA must be held in a broad 
manner. This broad interpretation allows for the protection of e-mails and 
is within the original intent of the protections guaranteed by the SCA.90 
Otherwise, individuals will be left with a wide gap in critical privacy 
protections. 
                                                                                                                                      
 84. Id. at 842. An e-mail service that kept permanent copies of temporary messages 
could not be described as “backing up” those messages. Id. (quoting Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 
359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 85. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator's 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1218 (2004).    
 86. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 840, 842. Anzaldua claimed his draft e-mail to Dr. Tan was in 
temporary storage and therefore covered under 18 U.S.C. 2510(17)(A). Such a situation is 
beyond the scope of this note (18 U.S.C. 2510(17)(B)). 
 87. Id. at 842.  
 88. Kristen L. Burge, Circuit Split Creates Data Protection Uncertainty, LITIGATION 
NEWS (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/111115-electronic-
storage-protection.html (last visited Oct. 5th, 2016). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See supra Section II.B.1. 
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A. A Narrow Interpretation: Cases in Agreement with Anzaldua 
Many courts have followed Anzaldua and interpreted the SCA in a 
narrower light. The Central District of California in Crispin v. Christian 
Audigier Inc. implicitly assumed that the plaintiff’s opened e-mail on his 
webmail were not downloaded, and as such, it held that these e-mails were 
not in backup storage and were not protected by the SCA’s § 2701(a)).91 
Similarly, in Jennings v. Jennings, the court held that because the copy of the 
e-mail was read and the webmail server was the only copy retained, there 
was no “backup” under the SCA.92 
B. A Broad Interpretation: Cases in Agreement with Theofel  
A number of other courts have followed Theofel and interpreted the SCA 
in a broad manner. The Central District of Illinois found that accessing 
server e-mail copies fell under the SCA’s purview when the plaintiff 
downloaded the e-mails to Outlook.93 Likewise, the Northern District of 
Iowa held that a plaintiff who downloaded e-mails to Outlook on his laptop 
computer properly alleged an SCA claim when defendants had accessed the 
Exchange server copies.94  
Courts that have interpreted the SCA under Theofel’s broader 
interpretation have not just protected downloaded e-mail from clients, but 
also e-mails opened on a webmail server. In Bailey v. Bailey, the plaintiff 
brought a suit under the SCA when the defendant accessed two of his 
Yahoo! e-mail accounts without permission.95 Agreeing with the reasoning 
in Theofel, this court found that “the plain language of the [SCA] seem[ed] 
to include e-mails received by the intended recipient where they remain 
stored by an electronic communication service.”96 In Fischer v. Mount Olive 
Lutheran Church Inc., the plaintiff sued the defendants under the SCA after 
they accessed his Hotmail account by guessing his password.97 The court 
cited the legislative history to hold “that Congress intended the [SCA] to 
                                                                                                                                      
 91. Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  
 92. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012).  
 93. See Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2011 WL 5930469, at *2, *6 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 
2011).  
 94. See Cornerstone Consultants, Inc. v. Prod. Input Sols., L.L.C., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 
1032-33, 1055 (N.D. Iowa 2011).  
 95. Bailey v. Bailey, No. 07-11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008). 
 96. Id. at *6.  
 97. Fischer v. Mount Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916-17, 920 
(W.D. Wis. 2002). 
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cover the exact situation in this case.”98 In its determination of Fischer, 
however, the court cited to nothing in its opinion to suggest that the 
plaintiff’s e-mails had been downloaded to a client; it can be presumed that 
the e-mails stayed on the webmail server after being read by the plaintiff.99 
The broad interpretation was most recently followed in 2013. In Cheng v. 
Romo, the court held that previously opened web-based e-mails were in 
“electronic storage” as defined by SCA because the Act did not specify for 
whose purposes the backup protection must be intended.100 The e-mail need 
only be backed up.101   
C. Courts May Have Followed Anzaldua Due to the E-mail Type   
Some analysts have tried to downplay the circuit split and reconcile the 
cases by explaining that each court’s reasoning as to its interpretation of the 
SCA was due to the different type of e-mail account used in each case.102 In 
Theofel, the plaintiff’s e-mail was on an ISP—a client e-mail.103 In contrast, 
the plaintiff in Anzaldua used Gmail as his e-mail provider.104 
While Anzaldua’s interpretation may be the court’s attempt to interpret 
the SCA under the technological changes to e-mail accounts, the heart of 
the discrepancy in the Act’s interpretation is not the type of e-mail provider, 
it is purpose for why the e-mail has been backed up. Since the SCA fails to 
define what a proper backup purpose is, the type of e-mail account used 
cannot be the only factor a court uses to interpret the SCA’s scope. Courts 
such as the Eastern District of Michigan and the United States District 
                                                                                                                                      
 98. Fischer, 207 F. Supp. at 925–26 (citing S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 36 (1986) (e-mail 
subscriber would violate SCA’s § 2701(a) by accessing other subscribers’ e-mails). 
 99. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn’t Violate the SCA, 
HAYNES AND BOONE, 
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx, (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
 100. Cheng v. Romo, No. 11—10007—DJC, 2013 WL 6814691, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 
2013).  
 101. Id.  
 102. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn’t Violate the SCA, 
HAYNES AND BOONE, 
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx, (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); see 
also Martha K. Gooding and Isabelle M. Carrillo, LAWYER? TRESPASSER?: How An Overly 
Broad Subpoena Can Turn Civil Discovery Into Snooping In Violation Of Federal Law, ABTL 
REPORT (Fall 2003), http://www.abtl.org/report/oc/abtlocvol5no3.pdf.  
 103. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1071.  
 104. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 827. 
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Court, District of Massachusetts are willing to be flexible in applying the 
SCA to warrant e-mail protection.105  
VII.  RECOMMENDING A MOVEMENT TOWARDS A  
BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE SCA 
To determine what may be included as electronic storage, it is important 
to remember the original intent of the SCA. It was created to prevent 
unauthorized access “[b]ecause looking at another’s e-mail is generally 
considered to be bad conduct, [and] courts have a tendency to want to find 
a violation.”106 The SCA must be interpreted under a broad interpretation 
like that of Theofel to keep the original intent of the Act. 
The SCA is notoriously hard to interpret.107 Even after centuries of 
judicial and scholarly effort, “[t]he hard truth of the matter is that American 
courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied 
theory of statutory interpretation.”108 Nevertheless, the courts have been 
tasked to interpret statutes like the SCA and must do so to protect the 
privacy of individuals. Without a definition, as to what electronic storage 
for a backup purpose is, courts have scant direction on how to interpret the 
SCA in any context, let alone in the current digital age. The SCA should be 
uniformly interpreted among courts, preventing circuit splits like those of 
Theofel and Anzaldua, and thereby adequately protecting the privacies of 
individuals in this technological age by giving them a standard to which 
they will expect their e-mail communications to be safeguarded.   
A. Canons of Construction  
Despite the inherent difficulty that comes with statutory interpretation, 
the “canons of construction” provide the courts with guidance on how 
statutes should be interpreted. Accordingly, courts should use these canons, 
and use them correctly, in interpreting the SCA.  
                                                                                                                                      
 105. Id. 
 106. Jannis E. Goodnow, Party Held Liable for Unauthorized E-mail Access, LITIGATION 
NEWS (Apr. 25, 2014), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/042514-stored-
communications-act.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 107. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging 
the difficulty in interpreting the Act because “the ECPA was written prior to the advent of 
the Internet and the World Wide Web”). 
 108. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
The Foundation Press 1994).  
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A court may only apply these canons if the statute is found to be 
ambiguous.109 Courts have generally held that a statute is ambiguous when 
reasonably well-informed persons could understand the language in either 
of two or more senses.110 Here, the SCA’s language for “backup purposes” 
has quite clearly been understood in two senses because the courts in 
Theofel and Anzaldua came to two opposite conclusions regarding the 
language. Therefore, this part of the SCA is ambiguous and it is appropriate 
to apply the canons of construction.  
The canons of construction are theories, which guide the methods and 
sources used in statutory interpretation.111 “The three dominant theories of 
how statutes should be interpreted—new textualism, intentionalism, and 
pragmatism—are each comprised of a collection of assertions about which 
interpretive rules are appropriate.”112  
When interpreting a statute, the interpreter will choose a particular 
canon due to his or her preferred methodology.113 “When a legislature 
enacts a statute, its members have certain ideas about how those words 
convey meaning.”114 “ 
Regardless of the theory of interpretation applied, a broad interpretation 
of the SCA should prevail. Each of the three theories militates for the 
conclusion that the Theofel court came to—that the SCA should protect e-
mail even after it has been sent and simply stays on the server. This is in 
contrast to the Anzaldua court’s narrow interpretation of the SCA wherein 
an e-mail that is simply left on a server does not serve a backup purpose and 
therefore is not afforded protection under the SCA.115  
                                                                                                                                      
 109. Under the "plain-meaning" rule, if the intention of the legislature is "so apparent 
from the face of the statute that there can be no question as to its meaning, there is no need 
for the court to apply canons of construction." Canons of Construction, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/law/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/canons-
construction (citing Overseas Educ. Ass'n v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 876 F.2d 960 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989)).   
 110. Neelen v. Lucas, 24 Wis. 2d 262, 267 (1964).  
 111. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 341, 343 (2010). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. While an interpreter’s preferred method may be used when looking at the 
‘canons of construction’ the first time, once a court interprets the statute, other courts 
usually will not go through the exercise again, but rather will enforce the statute as 
interpreted by the other court. Statutory Construction, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statutory_construction.  
 114. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 341, 343 (2010).  
 115. See supra Section VI.A.  
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1. New Textualism  
For new textualists, the statutory language itself . . . is the best evidence of 
legislative intent.”116 Under the new textualist theory, the courts look to 
linguistic inferences that encourage interpreters to follow the ordinary 
usage of text, unless the legislature has itself defined the word or the phrase 
has acquired a technical meaning.117 Because dictionaries report common 
usage, the dictionary rule supports consulting widely used dictionary 
definitions of terms the legislature has not defined.118  
In applying this to the SCA, the legislature did not define and ordinary 
usage of the text “backup protection.” Therefore, it is appropriate to look to 
the dictionary definition of these words. Merriam-Webster defines 
“backup” as, “one that serves as a substitute or support.”119 It also defines 
protection as, “the act of protecting.”120 Merriam-Webster then defines 
“protect” as, “to cover or shield from exposure, injury, damage, or 
destruction.”121 Under new textualism then, “backup protection” is a 
substitute, which is meant to cover or prevent something from destruction. 
With this theory, the SCA will allow for e-mail to be protected when its 
storage on a server is for the purpose of a substitute to shield the e-mail 
from destruction.  
New textualism allows “for the purpose of backup protection” to be 
satisfied under both e-mail clients and webmail providers, even though the 
storage of e-mail has changed. The storage of e-mail under an e-mail client 
is active, one has to purposefully download the e-mail to view and save it. 
                                                                                                                                      
 116. Id. at 348.  
 117. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994) (using ordinary 
usage canon to hold that the Federal Communication Commission’s authority to “modify” 
tariff requirements does not allow it to waive tariffs because “‘[m]odify,’ in [the Court’s] 
view, connotes moderate change” and stating that “[i]t might be good English to say that the 
French Revolution ‘modified’ the status of the French nobility—but only because there is a 
figure of speech called understatement and a literary device known as sarcasm.”). 
 118. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998) (consulting the Oxford 
English Dictionary, 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, and Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language 
Unabridged for the meaning of the word “carry”). 
 119. Backup, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (1828); also found at 
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/backup?utm_campaign= 
sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld.   
 120. Protection, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (1828); also found at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/protection.  
 121. Protect, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (1828); also found at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/protecting.  
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Webmail storage, on the other hand, is more passive because messages are 
not downloaded to the user’s personal device; they simply remain stored on 
the server until expressly deleted. However, this does not mean that the 
purpose of the storage needs to change. 
In order to be protected under the SCA, the e-mail, not only needs to be 
stored for backup purposes, but also needs to be stored as electronic 
storage. “To store” is defined as, “to place or leave in a location . . . for 
preservation or later use or disposal.”122 Therefore, for an e-mail to be 
stored, it must be left in a location for preservation or later use. With both 
e-mail clients and webmail providers, it can be said that e-mail is stored. 
For an e-mail client, e-mail is stored when the individual places the e-mail 
on his personal device; this occurs the moment he downloads it for the use 
of viewing the e-mail. With a webmail provider, e-mail can only be stored 
on the server because it downloads the e-mail automatically to enable an 
individual to view it right away. In leaving the e-mail on the server, an 
individual stores it to simply preserve it (shown by the decision not to 
delete it) or for future use in his work.  
Whether e-mail is stored for the purpose of backup needs to be evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis because an individual’s purpose is a subjective 
argument. Nevertheless, the argument for protection under the SCA can be 
made with both types of e-mail because in either case an e-mail may be held 
as a substitute to shield it from destruction. With an e-mail client, an 
individual will have initially downloaded the e-mail for the purpose of 
viewing it, but an individual may decide to keep the e-mail so that she has a 
second copy, or she may want to keep the information as a reminder. 
Therefore, this would satisfy the definition of “backup purposes” under 
Merriam-Webster, and therefore the definition of new textualism. Similarly, 
an e-mail viewed on a webmail application may also serve as “backup 
protection” under the statute even if it simply stays on the server because an 
individual may choose to keep it on the server so that it is not lost. 
Accordingly, new textualism lends itself to a broad interpretation of the 
SCA by allowing e-mail simply stored on a server to be protected under the 
SCA123 because it may be stored for a purpose within the definition of 
“backup protection.”  
                                                                                                                                      
 122. The word storage is not defined within the SCA, so the dictionary is an appropriate 
source. Store, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (1828); also found at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/store.  
 123. See supra Section VI.B. 
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2. Intentionalism 
“Intentionalist theories emphasize the realization of legislative intent as 
the aim of statutory interpretation.”124 “Democratic values play a critical 
part in shaping intentionalism.”125 “Statutes are the product of 
representative democracy, and the will of the legislative body is what 
constitutes ‘intent.’”126  
The intentionalist theory, in its bent towards legislative intent, also lends 
itself to a broad interpretation of the SCA. When legislators first wrote the 
SCA, they intended it to protect against the growing problem of 
unauthorized persons deliberately gaining access to, and sometimes 
tampering with, electronic or wire communications that were not intended 
to be available to the public.127 If the SCA is interpreted under the narrow 
viewpoint of Anzaldua where an e-mail simply left on a webmail provider is 
never be protected because an individual will not have any further use for 
it,128 this e-mail will be open to tampering and unauthorized access because 
the SCA will not protect it. An individual will be left vulnerable to the 
whims of a hacker or unscrupulous individual.  
However, this would not be the case if the SCA were held to the broad 
interpretation of Theofel. Under a broad interpretation, e-mail is protected 
when held by either an e-mail client or a webmail provider. Therefore, it 
will stop the growing problem of unauthorized access to e-mail because the 
individual will have a course of action against an individual who tampers 
with his e-mail. In its focus on the legislature’s intent (which was to protect 
individual privacy). This dominant theory of statutory interpretation lends 
itself to a broad interpretation. 
3. Pragmatism  
“Pragmatic theories reflect a more dynamic and flexible view.”129 
“[P]ragmatism relies on multiple supporting arguments rather than any 
conclusive single argument such as statutory text, specific legislative intent, 
imaginative reconstruction, legislative purpose, evolution of statute, or 
current democratic, rule of law, and social values.”130 Pragmatism 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 62 (1986). 
 128. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842. 
 129. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 341, 349 (2010). 
 130. Id.  
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recommends a broad interpretation of the SCA through the idea of 
evolution and current social values.  
The SCA—originally passed in the infancy of the internet—continues to 
face criticism for its lack of protection for individuals. In order to help the 
SCA evolve, Congress implemented two reforms: the E-mail Privacy Act131 
and The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 
2015.132 Both of these acts are very similar. Both seek to strengthen the need 
for warrants and to remove the reliance on the definition of “electronic 
storage,” which has confused lower courts.133 Both areas of reform show 
that the legislature is trying to apply “electronic storage for backup 
protection” in the SCA to the 21st century. This mentality is found in a 
broad interpretation, not a narrow interpretation, as a broad interpretation 
works to apply electronic storage to changing technology patterns, thereby 
providing more protection to individuals.  
Social consensus shows a need for more protection of individuals’ e-mail. 
Most Americans have strong views about the importance of privacy in their 
everyday lives.134 The majority of Americans believe it is important—often 
very important—that they be able to maintain privacy and confidentiality in 
commonplace activities of their lives.135 Americans are entitled to know 
which of their personal items are protected from unauthorized access,136 
and a broad interpretation of the SCA will allow for this deserved 
protection. A broad interpretation would protect both an e-mail client and 
a webmail provider. Therefore, individuals would know if their e-mail 
would be protected from unwanted access. A universal allowance of a broad 
SCA interpretation will align with the social consensus for privacy.  
Therefore, pragmatism—the last of the major theories of statutory 
interpretation—also militates for a broad interpretation in its use of 
                                                                                                                                      
 131. See supra Section IV.B.  
 132. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015, H.R. 283 (114th 
Cong. (2015)). 
 133. Richard M. Thompson II & Jared P. Cole, Stored Communications Act: Reform of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (May 19, 
2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44036.pdf. 
 134. Mary Madden & Lee Raine, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and 
Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-
surveillance/. 
 135. Id. 93% of adults say that being in control of who can get information about them is 
important; 74% feel this is “very important,” while 19% say it is “somewhat important.” Id. 
 136. See generally United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (stating that 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of an e-mail message).   
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textualism, legislative intent, the evolution of the SCA, and current social 
values. As such, all three areas of statutory interpretation, when applied to 
the SCA, lend themselves to a broad interpretation. 
B. Congress Can Ensure a Broad Interpretation of the SCA.   
In the near future, Congress should implement reforms to ensure a broad 
interpretation of the SCA. This will explicitly enhance e-mail protection. In 
his article published in the Harvard Law Review, Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz argues that (1) Congress can and should help select the tools 
for interpreting federal statutes, (2) that it has the constitutional power to 
do so, and (3) that it would be wise to exercise this power.137 While 
Congressional enactment of interpretive strategies tends to be rare, 
tentative, and ad hoc, it may be done through three proposals: dictionary 
definitions, canons, and legislative history.138 All three of these methods 
may be used to ensure that Congress interprets the SCA in a broad manner 
to allow the same of future courts.  
1. Dictionary Definitions  
Rosenkranz argues that the dictionary would relieve one form of 
miscommunication because it would allow for a legislator to simply look up 
a word he did not understand in a statute—thereby rendering a statute 
more determinate.139 While not a total relief of statutory ambiguity, it would 
be a step in the right direction. Congress could be free to define simply what 
a backup purpose would be in future SCA reform.   
2. Canons of Construction  
Another option that Rosenkranz proposes is the use of the canons of 
construction. Presented above, each of the three theories of construction 
lend themselves to a broad interpretation of the SCA. However, Congress 
could use clear statement rules in SCA reform, which would allow for 
explicit ways to achieve certain goals.140 The statements could implement a 
broad interpretation of the SCA that would cover technology changes in the 
future. This would eliminate a great deal of uncertainty with respect to these 
goals and leave all power over them squarely in the hands of Congress.141 
                                                                                                                                      
 137. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2085, 2086 (2002).  
 138. Id. at 2147-51.  
 139. Id. at 2147.  
 140. Id. at 2149. 
 141. Id.  
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3. Legislative History  
The final proposal looks to legislative history. While a fierce debate rages 
as to whether this is a proper way to interpret statutes, Congress does have 
the power to say (and thus end this issue) what “for the purpose of 
background protection” means.142 All it would take is one sentence: 
“Backup protection shall include any . . .”143 While this may be initially seen 
as a narrow interpretation, Congress could ensure, using the canons of 
construction, that it is broadly constructed to cover future technological 
advances. These options may be an answer to help ensure a broad 
interpretation because they allow Congress to explicitly control how the 
statute is interpreted, instead of allowing the inconsistencies that the SCA 
now faces. It would allow the SCA to be controlled under an interpretation 
granting privacy protection for technology now and in the future.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION: A BROAD INTERPRETATION MEANS  
PROTECTION FOR YEARS TO COME 
The Stored Communications Act, a part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, is a Congressional enactment intended to 
protect against unauthorized access to electronic communications in 
electronic storage—including both temporary storage and storage for the 
purposes of backup protection.  
The problem with the SCA lies in the definition of electronic storage 
because Congress never defined what exactly “electronic storage for backup 
protection” included. As a result, this led to a circuit split between the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits in the cases Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & 
Fire Protection District and Theofel v. Farey-Jones, respectively. Each court 
came to an opposite conclusion as to whether e-mail was protected under 
the SCA. Theofel allowed for a broad interpretation of backup protection, 
an interpretation that would include protection for e-mail under e-mail 
clients and webmail providers. However, Anzaldua worked with a more 
narrow definition, and as a result, e-mail simply left on a webmail’s server 
was not protected under the SCA. Given the growth of technology and the 
individuals’ desire for protection, a narrow interpretation will not allow for 
these needs. A broad interpretation, however, does.  
The SCA needs to be universally interpreted under this broad viewpoint. 
By looking to the canons of construction, courts may do interpret the SCA 
in this broad manner. The three main interpretations—new textualism, 
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intentionalism, and pragmatism—all speak to allowing for a broad 
interpretation due to dictionary definitions, Congress’ original intent 
behind the SCA, the Act’s evolution, and social consensus theories. All 
showcase the need for more protection of e-mail.  
Finally, and most importantly, a broad interpretation of the SCA, will 
allow for the protection of e-mail in the years to come. A broad 
interpretation will allow the SCA to incorporate e-mail as it changes 
because it will allow for courts to take into account the original intent of 
Congress, the privacy wants of individuals, and ultimately, the privacy 
needs that individuals are entitled to in their everyday use of e-mail.   
 
 
